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INTRODUCTION
The American public is being tantalized by the promise of being able
to use the television to call up movies and other forms of entertainment on
demand in the near future. Through the television, the consumer will also
be able to access a spectrum of on-line information or benefit from
consumer services, all without ever leaving home.' Government officials
have heralded communications advances as an opportunity to foster
economic development, create jobs, improve health care, advance
educational goals, and enhance quality of life.2 Businesses are scrambling
to diversify and merge with communications entities to secure a share in
the developing multimedia market
Everyone seems to want a piece of the evolving information
superhighway, but many observers wonder what part competition will play
in the new communications structure. Many critics already disagree on what
role government should play in promoting and regulating competition
among developing and expanding telecommunications industries.4 President
Bill Clinton's administration has pushed for legislation to ease regulations
which currently restrict telecommunications-service providers, allowing
them to participate in further development of an information superhigh-
way.5
Technological advances and changes in the marketplace, coupled with
an outdated regulatory scheme based on restrictions laid down with the
divestiture of AT&T, are hindering local telephone companies' opportuni-
1. See generally Joshua Quittner, Online to a Revolution, NEWSDAY, July 18, 1993,
at 4; Jolie Solomon, Big Brother's Holding Company, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 25, 1993, at 38; The
New Communications Era, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 14, 1993, at B1; Mortimer B. Zuckerman,
Welcome to Communicopia, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 1, 1993, at 116.
2. See NATIONAL TELECOMM. AND INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE
NTIA INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT: TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE AGE OF INFORMATION 34
(1991) [hereinafter INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT].
3. Kent Gibbons, A War on Hold: Newspapers, Phone Companies Edge Closer to Info-
Truce, WASH. TIMES, June 6, 1993, at A12; William Glaberson, The Baby Bells Are Finding
an Unlikely Ally in the Information-Services War: Newspapers, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1993,
§ 1, at 41. For a detailed discussion of recent mergers and alliances, see Andrew C. Barrett,
Shifting Foundations: The Regulation of Telecommunications in an Era of Change, 46 FED.
COMM. L.J. 39 (1993).
4. See Ronald E. Yates, Regulation Clogs Information Superhighway, CHI. TRIB., Jan.
3, 1994, § 4, at 1.
5. National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Action, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,025 (1993)
[hereinafter Agenda for Action]. Agenda for Action describes the administration's intended
role for government in promoting and developing a telecommunications and information
infrastructure. See also Debra Gersh Hernandez, Telecommunications and the Clinton
Administration, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Jan. 15, 1994, at 11.
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ties to participate in the telecommunications revolution and compete with
other communication-service providers. Lifting regulations will help ensure
that local telephone-service providers can competitively participate in
advances and remain market players. One piece of legislation overwhelm-
ingly passed by the House of Representatives in the 103d Congress, House
Bill 3626, would have eased such restrictions on local telephone compa-
nies.'
Part I of this Note will review how local telephone companies have
been regulated since the AT&T divestiture and subsequent judicial actions.
Part II will discuss the advantages of a competitive communications
marketplace. Part III will examine House Bill 3626 (the Antitrust Reform
Act of 1993), which would gradually lift regulations that currently prevent
local telephone-service providers from competing in many communications
markets. Part IV will look at the benefits of allowing local telephone
companies to compete free of current restrictions. This Note concludes that
enactment of House Bill 3626 or a significantly similar measure in the next
Congress would further the development of the national telecommunications
infrastructure, benefit consumers, and allow Bell Operating Companies to
protect their business interests by expanding into developing markets.
I. REGULATION OF LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPANIES SINCE
DIVESTITURE OF AT&T
Many analysts mark the AT&T divestiture as the beginning of the
current telecommunications revolution. According to telecommunications
analyst Blake Bath, "The divestiture has to get a lot of credit for creating
the pre-eminent telecommunications market in the world."7 The Supreme
Court has recognized the "revolution in telecommunications occasioned by
the federal policy of increasing competition in the industry."8 Therefore,
any examination of current local and long-distance telephone service
regulation must start with at least a surface understanding of the divestiture
of AT&T.9
6. H.R. 3626, 103d Cong., 1st Ses. (1993); see William J. Eaton & Leslie Helm,
House Rewrites Phone, Cable Rules, L.A. TIMEs, June 29, 1994, at Al; Carolyn Lochhead,
Historic Reform of Telephone, Cable OKd; House Votes by Landslide to Boost Telecommu-
nications Competition, S.F. CHRON., June 29, 1994, at Al; Vote Shows Wide Support,
COMM. DAILY, June 29, 1994, at 1.
7. Paul Carranza & Colleen M. McElroy, A Decade of Revolution in Telecommunica-
tions; Breakup ofAT&TBrought Lower Prices, New Services, Vast Potential, BUFF. NEWS,
Jan. 1, 1994, at A13.
8. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 358 (1986).
9. For more detailed sources concerning the history of the divestiture action, see
generally STEvE COLL, THE DEAL OF THE CENTURY: THE BREAKUP OF AT&T (1986);
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A. Effect of the Modification of Final Judgment
In United States v. AT&T, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia (decree court) ended an antitrust action suit brought
by the Department of Justice against AT&T, Western Electric, and Bell
Telephone Laboratories by approving a consent decree reached by the
parties."0 The consent decree mandated the divestiture of AT&T and the
reorganization of local telephone service into Regional Bell Operating
Companies (BOCs or Baby Bells) which oversee local operating compa-
nies. This decision and subsequent actions have become commonly
known as the Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ).' 2 Before the
breakup, AT&T, which had built a nationwide telecommunications network
as a regulated monopoly, was restricted to offering common carrier
telephone services. 3 In AT&T, the court found that divestiture was
necessary because AT&T had used its monopoly control over local markets
to preclude competition in those markets. 4
The MFJ granted a monopoly over local service areas to the newly-
formed operating companies, provided they gave equal access to all
telephone service carriers, especially AT&T's competitors. 5 Other terms
of the MFJ imposed line-of-business restrictions, which limited the range
of services the Baby Bells could provide, specifically prohibiting the
operating companies from engaging in "(1) the provision of interexchange
[or interLATA] services;' 6 (2) the provision of information services; (3)
the manufacture of telecommunications products and customer premises
equipment; (4) the marketing of such equipment and (5) directory
advertising."' 7 The court justified the restrictions as necessary to prevent
PETER TEMIN, THE FALL OF THE BELL SYSTEM (1987).
10. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131,178-79 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'dsub nom., Maryland v. United
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
11. Id. at 141. Seven BOCs manage the individual local telephone systems. The regional
companies and their geographical areas include: NYNEX Corp. (New York and New
England), Bell Atlantic Corp. (Mid-Atlantic), BellSouth Corp. (South), Ameritech
(Midwest), Southwestern Bell Corp. (Southwest), and PacTel (California and Nevada).
12. Richard A. Hindman, The Diversity Principle and the MFJ Information Services
Restriction: Applying Time-Worn First Amendment Assumptions to New Technologies, 38
CATH. U. L. REV. 471, 472 n.3 (1989).
13. Id. at 497. A common carrier "means any person engaged as a common carrier for
hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio." 47 U.S.C. §153(h) (1988).
14. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 161-62.
15. Id. at 142-43, 227.
16. To avoid confusion, the court adopted the term LATA, or "local access transport
area," in place of "exchange" when referring to the MFJ.
17. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 186 (footnote added).
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the newly formed operating companies from subsidizing prices in
competitive markets with profits earned in monopoly markets and from
hindering competitors by restricting access."
The judgment included a provision for removing restrictions on the
BOCs "upon a showing by the petitioning BOC that there is no substantial
possibility that it could use its monopoly power to impede competition in
the market it seeks to enter,"' 9 putting a substantial burden of proof on the
BOC. The decision also included a provision for judicial review of the MFJ
by the decree court every three years to consider lifting restrictions on
BOCs.
20
The AT&T reorganization plan divided the country into 164 exchange
areas, or LATAs.2' Each local operating company includes several
LATAs, but is only allowed to provide transmissions within a single
LATA, providing what is commonly known as local telephone service.'
Local telephone companies derive their revenue by providing intraLATA
services.' When a call is placed from one LATA to another, even if it is
within the same BOC region, the call must be transmitted to an inter-
exchange carrier, such as AT&T or one of its long-distance competitors,
and be transmitted across LATA boundaries and picked up by the BOC
serving that LATA.24 Thus, the MFJ prevents Baby Bells from offering
any interexchange transmissions across LATA boundaries-whether it is a
telephone conversation or a stream of information-even within their own
region.
B. Attempts to Lift Restrictions on BOCs
In 1987, as part of the first three-year review of the MFJ, the
Department of Justice recommended that the court modify the interLATA
services restriction and remove other line-of-business restrictions.
"[S]ubsequent technological, economic and regulatory changes have
sufficiently reduced the competitive danger of BOC entry into any of these
fields," said one report at the time.' The court maintained manufacturing
18. Id. at 187.
19. Id. at 231.
20. Id. at 195.
21. Christy Cornell Kunin, Unilateral Exculpation in the Era of Competitive
Telecommunications, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 907, 917 (1993).
22. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 990, 994-95 (D.D.C. 1983).
23. Kunin, supra note 21, at 917.
24. Id.
25. See Report and Recommendations of the United States Concerning the Line of
Business Restrictions Imposed on the Bell Operating Companies by the Modification of
Final Judgment at 6-7, United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525 (D.D.C. 1987)
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and interLATA restrictions, but lifted the catch-all restriction and modified
the information-services ban.26 The court of appeals reversed the decision
to remove the information-services restriction, and maintained that the
decree court should have analyzed the recommendation under a "public
interest" standard implicit in Section VII of the decree,27 rather than under
the monopoly power test detailed in Section VIII(C).21 In July 1991, the
decree court issued an order staying the information-services ban, pending
appeal.29 The court of appeals affirmed the modification lifting the ban,
explaining that the public interest standard included "probable effects of
competition within the relevant market."3
The AT&T case and subsequent reviews, appeals, and modifications
have created a mishmash of opinions, regulations, and standards for review.
A search of the appellate history of the original case outlining the MFJ
restrictions yields more than 100 subsequent actions. Trying to make any
sense of current telecommunications and telephone service policy from
these scattered sources is burdensome, if not impossible.
At present, BOCs are free to offer information services, but it is
unclear whether they can transport those services across LATA lines. The
bans on manufacturing and offering long-distance services still stand, with
little clarity on which standards should be used to decide whether to lift
these restrictions. For now, BOCs want a modification allowing them to
seek entry into a new market. But they must wait for the next triennial
review and then make their case for lifting a restriction.
II. BENEFITS OF COMPETITION IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INDUSTRY
There seems to be agreement that, for most industries, competition in
some form is good for consumers and for furthering public policy.3' The
telecommunications industry is no different. Analysis of the effects of the
AT&T divestiture shows that allowing BOCs to compete in telecommunica-
tions markets will help prevent any one entity from controlling too much
(No. 81-0192), affd in part and rev'd and remanded in part, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied sub nom., MCI Comm. Corp. v. United States, 498 U.S. 911 (1990).
26. Id. at 540-562.
27. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 186 (D.D.C. 1982) (describing the
"public interest" standard applied by the court), aff'd sub nom., Maryland v. United States,
460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
28. See id. at 231.
29. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308 (D.D.C. 1991).
30. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 993 F.2d 1572, 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
31. See TEMIN, supra note 9, at 344.
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of the market share, keep costs for communications services low, spur
technological innovations, and further public policy.
A. Market Share
Competition helps prevent any one service from holding too much
power over the telecommunications market. Immediately after divestiture
in 1985, AT&T enjoyed 80 percent of the market share for long-distance
services.32 Eight years later, AT&T's share had dropped to 60 percent due
to competition by some 400 competing interexchange carriers." The
number of carriers serving more than forty-five states has grown from only
two to nine.34
As Baby Bells enter other markets, they bring additional competition
to existing industries as the national information network is constructed.
"[P]romoting competition ... will prevent the kind of single-behemoth
providers that the regulators are concerned about," says Suzanne Tichenor,
a vice president of the Washington-based Council on Competitiveness.
35
B. Infrastructure Development
Whatever the effects of the AT&T divestiture, the long-distance
service market has grown under a competitive scheme, in both financial and
technical terms. The total long-distance market has grown from $38.8
billion in 1984 to $59.4 billion in 1993.36 Increased competition and rapid
technological advances have forced AT&T to become more responsive to
consumer demands.37 Before the break-up, AT&T had little incentive to
introduce products invented by its research division.38 In 1985, for
example, AT&T decided not to build a nationwide fiber-optic system. A
competitor, Sprint, soon started running advertisements highlighting the
clarity of Sprint's fiber-optic lines. Within a month, AT&T reevaluated its
decision and, today, its fiber-optic network has grown from several hundred
32. Hearings on H.R. 3626 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 2nd Sess. 184 (1994) [hereinafter Hundt
testimony] (testimony of Reed Hundt, Chairman, FCC).
33. Id. Other major long-distance service providers include MCI, with a 20% share of
the market, and Sprint, which holds a 10% share. See also Carranza & McElroy, supra note
7, at A13.
34. Hundt testimony, supra note 32, at 184.
35. Yates, supra note 4, § 4, at 1.
36. Hundt testimony, supra note 32, at 193.
37. Carranza & McElroy, supra note 7, at A13.
38. Aaron Zitner, 10 Years Later, Bell's Breakup Impact Grows, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
27, 1993, at 38.
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miles to more than 35,000 miles. 39 The variety of equipment and services
available to customers has dramatically expanded since deregulation.40
Many analysts cite the divestiture's effect on AT&T as an indication that
more competition among all telecommunications providers will eventually
lead to even better service and more innovations for consumers.4 '
C. Keeping Costs Low
The common wisdom is that extensive regulation keeps telephone
rates low. 42 Yet, long-distance telephone rates have decreased by approxi-
mately 50 percent in real dollars since divestiture. 43 Before divestiture, the
price of a ten-minute daytime call from Chicago to Atlanta, in 1993 dollars,
was $6.28; after increased competition, the same call costs only $2.30.'
These decreased costs to consumers occurred while the total long-distance
market grew from $38.8 billion in 1984 to $59.4 billion in 1992 and while
total traffic volume grew from 167 billion minutes to 212 billion min-
utes.45 Increased competition in other telecommunications markets can be
expected to achieve the same positive results as long-distance competition
for all parties.46 BOC-backed studies say competition in the long-distance
market could save consumers $30 billion in phone rates over a decade. 7
D. Furthering Public Policy
The Clinton administration has made the development of the National
Information Infrastructure (NII) to provide widespread telecommunications
services a top priority.48 The administration has proposed administrative
and legislative reform of telecommunications policy based on the following
39. Id.
40. Hearings on H.R. 3626 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1994) [hereinafter Irving
testimony] (testimony of Larry Irving, Assistant Secretary for Communications and
Information, U.S. Dep't of Commerce).
41. Guy Halverson, Callers Win From Leaps in Telephone Technology, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 7, 1994, at 9.
42. Id.
43. Hearings on H.R. 3626 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. 135 (1994) [hereinafter Bingaman
testimony] (testimony of Anne K. Bingaman, Assis't Attorney General, Antitrust Div., U.S.
Dep't of Commerce).
44. Hundt testimony, supra note 32, at 193-94.
45. Id. at 194.
46. ld.
47. Eaton & Helm, supra note 6, at A16.
48. Laurent Belsie, Gore Supports Move to End Information Monopolies, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 23, 1993, at 9.
[Vol. 47
MISSED CONNECTIONS
principles: (1) encouraging investment in the NII; (2) promoting and
protecting competition; 3) providing open access to the NII by consumers
and service providers; (4) ensuring universal service; and (5) ensuring a
regulatory framework flexible enough to handle rapid market and
technological changes within the telecommunications industry.4 9
The administration has acknowledged that current regulations may
harm consumers by impeding competition and discouraging investment in
the NII. To promote growth of the NII, the administration has supported
legislation that would eliminate burdensome regulations and increase
competition both by companies already in the telecommunications market
and those seeking entry."
III. H.R. 3626: A PROPOSAL TO LIFT MFJ RESTRICTIONS
On November 22, 1993, Rep. Jack Brooks (D-Tex.) and Rep. John
Dingell (D-Mich.) introduced H.R. 3626 (Brooks-Dingell bill or Antitrust
Reform Act) in the House of Representatives, a move to supersede the
Modification of Final Judgment in AT&T." In introducing the bill, Rep.
Dingell said enactment would allow Congress to "reclaim its rightful role
in formulating telecommunications policy."52 The bill sets forth a series
of incremental dates after which BOCs may petition the Attorney General
and the FCC for permission to provide services restricted by MFJ
provisions. 3
The Brooks-Dingell bill was not the only telecommunications
legislation passed by the House of Representatives during the first session
of 1993. House Telecommunication Subcommittee Chairman Ed Markey
(D-Mass.) and Rep. Jack Fields (R-Tex.) sponsored House Bill 3636, which
would have required that local phone companies allow competitors, such
49. Administration White Paper on Communications Act Reforms 1 (Jan. 27, 1994).
50. Id.
51. H.R. 3626, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The bill has two titles. Title I, the
Antitrust Reform Act of 1993, concerns the supersession of MFJ restrictions and is the
subject of this Note. Title II, the Communications Reform Act of 1993, concerns the
regulation of manufacturing, alarm services, and electronic publishing by BOCs.
52. 139 CONG. REC. H10,911 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1993) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
53. H.R. 3626, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Rep. Dingell was involved in earlier
congressional efforts to lift MFJ restrictions. See Dingell Joins Bipartisan Group in
Endorsing Free-RHC Effort, CoMM. DAILY, July 15, 1988, at 4. One resolution suggested
removing the line-of-business restrictions to promote development of a public transportation
network and further public policy by improving the capacity of the United States to better
compete in the global information and high technology marketplace. H.R. Con. Res. 339,
100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. E2412-13 (1988).
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as cable companies, to have access to their telephone lines.14 The Brooks-
Dingell bill, by contrast, was focused on issues presented by MFJ
restrictions."
A. Time Frame for Review
The Brooks-Dingell bill allows BOCs to request authorization to
provide services in noncompetitive markets, offer interexchange telecom-
munications services incidental to another BOC service, and provide
interstate, interexchange telecommunications services that originate and
terminate within the BOC's service area immediately upon enactment. 6
The BOCs may request authorization to provide interexchange services by
acquiring and reselling those services eighteen months after enactment.57
Sixty months after enactment, the BOCs could ask permission to provide
any interstate telecommunications services. 8
B. Standards for Review
Before a BOC could offer expanded services, the Attorney General
and the FCC would publish an application for authorization in the Federal
Register within ten days of receipt. Interested parties could then comment
within forty-five days.59 The bill requires the Attorney General and the
FCC to consult with each other before issuing separate written determina-
tions, based on clear and convincing evidence of their decision to grant, or
not grant, interstate service. 0 The Attorney General is to approve applica-
tions only upon finding "that there is no substantial possibility that such
company or its affiliates could use monopoly power to impede competition
in the market such company seeks to enter."'" This is the standard
currently used, at least in part, by the decree court.62
The bill allows the FCC to approve the BOC's proposals to the extent
that granting permission to enter new communications markets would be
54. H.R. 3636, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); see also Eaton & Helm, supra note 6, at
A16.
55. Brooks and Dingell Introduce MFJ Bill, COMM. DAILY, Nov. 24, 1993, at 1.
56. H.R. 3626. The Department of Justice and the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC or Commission) must establish criteria for evaluation within 180 days of enactment
of the bill.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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consistent with public interest, convenience, and necessity.6" In making
such a determination, the FCC would consider whether approval would: (1)
reduce rates in the market the BOC seeks to enter; (2) increase rates for
exchange service; (3) further delivery of new products and services to
consumers; (4) permit collusion between BOCs; (5) result in concentration
among service providers to the detriment of consumers; and (6) whether
regulations will preclude the applicant from engaging in coercive practices
in the market that the applicant seeks to enter.' Authorization would be
granted to the extent that the FCC and the Attorney General both
approve.6' The bill requires that final opinions must be published in the
Federal Register, which would remain final unless vacated or reversed by
judicial review.66
Within forty-five days of a determination on the authorization request,
the BOC or "any person who might be injured in its business or its
property as a result of the determination" could institute a civil action in
the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit against the FCC or the Depart-
ment of Justice for review of the determination.67 The bill also includes
a provision precluding a BOC with a monopoly in any exchange-service
market from bundling services to lessen competition in any market.68
C. Reaction to the Bill
The Clinton administration announced its support for the bill,69 and
urged Congress to enact it quickly and with few changes. 70 FCC Chairman
Reed Hundt also endorsed the measure, saying, "[C]ompetition in this
market can be expected to produce the same positive results for consumers
that we have seen in other markets for telecommunications services that
have undergone the transformation from monopoly to competition:
technological and service innovation, lower prices, and responsiveness to
consumer tastes."'"
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. Bundling of services means to tie (directly or indirectly), in any relevant market,
the sale of any product or service to the provision of any telcommunications service.
69. Joanne Kelley, Clinton Endorses Choice for Phone, Cable Services, CHI. SUN-
TiMES, Jan. 27, 1994, at 46.
70. White House Officials Urge Lawmakers to Make Few Changes to Competition Bills,
Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at A-18 (Jan. 28, 1994).
71. Hundt testimony, supra note 32, at 202.
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Long-distance carriers lobbied against the effort and placed advertise-
ments with the slogan "Tell the Bells to mind their own business" in
newspapers and magazines.72 Several consumer groups also voiced
concerns about whether the measure would adequately protect consumers
from anticompetitive practices by BOCs. 7
3
The House of Representatives passed House Bill 3626 on June 28,
1994, by a lopsided vote of 423-5. 74 Assistant Secretary of Commerce
Larry Irving said support for the bill "crossed every possible ideological
and party line, indicating that it's pretty good legislation. 75
Telecommunications reform did not fare as well in the Senate. The
Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee less enthusiasti-
cally approved a telecommunications reform bill (Senate Bill 1822),
sponsored by Sen. Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.) on August 11, 1994.76 The
BOCs were displeased that the Senate bill set a higher standard for their
entry into the long-distance market by requiring that they face substantial
competition in their local telephone market before they can offer long-
distance services.77 Sen. Hollings pronounced the measure dead on
September 24, saying opposition by the BOCs and other factors would have
made it impossible to pass the bill before Congress adjourned.78
IV. BENEFITS OF EASING INTEREXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS ON
LOCAL EXCHANGE COMPANIES
Local telephone service has been described as a "natural monopoly"
or an industry where "it is less costly for a single firm to serve the market
than it is for two or more firms [to compete]."79 Some observers have
concluded that local telephone service is not a natural monopoly but a
regulated one, and that government should remove the artificial legal
barriers that perpetuate it." In addition, technological changes now make
72. Mind Your Own Business, COMMUNICATIONSWEEK, Jan. 3, 1994, at 109, 109.
73. Key Consumer Groups Opposing House Telco Measures, NATIONAL JOURNAL'S
CONGREssDAILY, Dec. 7, 1993.
74. Lochhead, supra note 6, at Al.
75. Id.
76. S. 1822, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
77. Aaron Zitner, House Votes to End Cable, Phone Curbs, BOSTON GLOBE, June 29,
1994, at 24.
78. Edmund L. Andrews, Bill to Revamp Communications Dies in Congress, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 1994, § I, at 1.
79. INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT, supra note 2, at 268-69.
80. See JOHN T. WENDERS, THE ECONOMICS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 173 (1987); see
also PETER W. HUBER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST Div., THE GEODESIC NETWORK:
1987 REPORT ON COMPETITION IN THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY 2.23 (1987).
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it desirable for local telephone companies to provide interexchange services
not contemplated when the MFJ restrictions were put into place.
A. Local Exchange Is Becoming More Competitive
While BOCs currently hold virtually the entire market share for local-
exchange services," technological advances are introducing formidable
competition into these services. Capital costs to enter the local telephone
service business would drop as telecommunications providers expand their
operating bases after the bill is passed.8"
Most cable television companies are already installing fiber-optic
transmission networks to enable their systems to carry new services,
including high-definition television and computer linkages. 3 Such fiber-
optic networks-which are capable of carrying voice transmissions-give
cable companies an opportunity to offer interLATA competition, either by
leasing facilities or by providing direct services.84 Major cable companies,
including TCI and Time Warner, have jointly invested in Teleport
Communications Group, a communications provider that will let cable
operators use their combined eighty million coaxial cables to offer local
telephone service." Other alternative local service providers have
introduced fiber-optic systems in highly populated areas to create
metropolitan area networks (MANs) intended to bypass Baby Bell local
access systems.86
Improving digital technology is enabling cellular phone systems to
greatly expand their capacity, which will eventually allow them to offer
local telephone services on a much larger scale.87 Cellular telephone
systems already have approximately fourteen million customers,88 and
industry estimates predict that number could grow to sixty million by the
year 2000.89 Development of a radio-based personal communications
system (PCS), for which the federal government will auction two licenses,
81. Nancy Hass, Betting on MCI? Don't Bury the Bells Just Yet, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 17,
1994, at 38, 38.
82. SCOTT C. CLELAND, COMMVERGENCE v. REGULATION: COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL FIVE-YEAR FORECAST 22 (1993).
83. See COMM. DAILY, Mar. 28, 1991, at 5.
84. INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT, supra note 2, at 264-65.
85. Leslie Helm, Talk Is Cheap, and Now Bells' Future Is Rich, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 25,
1993, at Al.
86. See Gail Garfield Schwartz & Jeffrey H. Hoagg, Virtual Divestiture: Structural
Reform of an RHC, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 285, 290 (1992).
87. Id. at 294.
88. Carranza & McElroy, supra note 7, at A13.
89. Peter Haynes, The End of the Line, ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 1993, at 5.
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will enlarge local telephone service competition even further.9" Even
current long-distance-service providers are investigating ways to move into
the interLATA market. In January 1994, MCI announced plans to spend
$20 billion over a six-year period to develop an electronic information
network that will include local exchange service.9 AT&T is the only
long-distance provider prohibited by the MFJ from entering the local
service market,9" leaving open the opportunity for entry in local telephone
service by any other long-distance provider.
While local exchange service may not yet be completely competitive,
it appears that technological advances will continue to draw business away
from the Baby Bells' monopoly. BOCs have already lost up to half the
revenues they once received from intraLATA service now carried by
competitors.93 House Bill 3626 contemplates the time when technological
advances cause local service companies to lose their predominant share of
the local exchange market and provides a mechanism for lifting regulations
when that happens.
B. BOCs Should Protect Their Financial Position
Increased competition from alternative local service providers and
regulated rate cuts have reduced the Baby Bells' average annual revenue
growth to 2.6 percent in the last 4 years, compared with 6.5 percent from
1984 through 1988. 94 To finance expansion efforts, some local operating
companies have cut payrolls. 9 Stephen Gutkowski of Moody's Investors
Service says, "there is a concern that the Baby Bells' financial position
could be impacted by the need to finance ... [expansion] with debt
capital. 96
90. INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT, supra note 2, at 264; CLELAND, supra note 82, at 27.
91. Martin Dickson, Uncle Sam's Super-Highway: In a Rapidly Changing Market, the
USIs Dismantling Telecommunications Regulations, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1994, at 23; Hass,
supra note 81, at 38. With a $2 billion investment, MCI could effectively bypass local
telephone systems in 20 of the country's largest markets and avoid access fees charged by
local providers. See William J. Cook et al., Fast Lane to the Future, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Jan. 17, 1994, at 56, 56.
92. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom., Maryland
v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
93. Phone-Cable Convergence Will Test Regulators 'Political Courage, State Telephone
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, Dec. 2, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNA File.
94. Cook et al., supra note 91, at 56.
95. From 1990 through 1992, Baby Bells eliminated 44,848 jobs. Id. One Baby Bell,
NYNEX, plans to cut another 16,800 positions by the end of 1996. David Robinson,
Suddenly, 'Utility' No Longer Means 'Monopoly,' BUFF. NEWs, Jan. 30, 1994, at DI0.
96. Cook et al., supra note 91, at 57.
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Lifting MFJ restrictions would allow BOCs to seek entry into
potentially profitable markets as telecommunications technology develops.
By doing so, they can realize a fair profit, which enables them to reinvest
in research and development without paring employees or borrowing
capital.
C. Eased Restrictions Would Facilitate Agency Review
Since the divestiture of AT&T, national telephone system policy has
been under the exclusive control of the decree court, with Judge Harold H.
Greene guiding decisions about how to interpret the MFJ. Congress never
intended the decree court to usurp power over determining communications
policy.97 The Clinton administration wants "to create a stable regulatory
environment" for telecommunications, not one subject to change by a new
court ruling every three years.98
The companies affected by the MFJ restrictions apparently would
welcome freedom from court jurisdiction.99 The reform called for in
House Bill 3626 would, in the words of Assistant Attorney General Anne
K. Bingaman, "move telecommunications policy out of the courtroom and
into the hands of the two expert agencies charged with protecting the public
interest in telecommunications [the FCC] and competition [the Department
of Justice]."' The bill would also allow a more consolidated and timely
approach for handling rapidly changing market conditions. The review
process set forth in House Bill 3626 ensures that regulations would
preclude local exchange companies from improperly entering restricted
markets. Because BOCs will not have to wait out a judicial review process,
they will not be excluded from evolving telecommunications opportunities
any longer than is beneficial or necessary.
D. Reform Would Allow BOCs to Contribute to Infrastructure
Development
The Administration maintains that the NI1 should be developed by the
private sector and driven by increased competition following eased
government regulations. The BOCs are uniquely suited to contribute to this
development. The local telephone companies have already built an
infrastructure that reaches into nearly every home in the United States. By
97.- See CLELAND, supra note 82, at 18.
98. See Dennis Wharton, FCC to Extend Freeze on Rate Increases, VARIETY, Nov. 22,
1993, at 27.
99. Robert D. Hershey, Jr., 2 in House Want to Free Baby Bells, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24,
1993, at D1.
100. Bingaman testimony, supra note 43, at 142.
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gaining the ability to compete in other markets, Baby Bells could
eventually reduce the total costs of constructing the NII by building on the
existing infrastructure.' 0 ' Preventing telephone companies from cooperat-
ing or competing with other NII participants could slow the process of
building a system.
E. Competitive Concerns Are Protected
In upholding the lower court ruling allowing BOCs to own informa-
tion services, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit noted the types of
companies against which Baby Bells would compete. "They include GE,
AT&T,... IBM, and Sears with their Prodigy service, Merrill-Lynch, ITT,
Mead Corporation, American Express, Citicorp, Chase Manhattan Bank,
and a variety of foreign and independent telephone companies.... These
firms are not pushovers."'"2 When entering any new telecommunications
market, Baby Bells are going to have to compete with large, well-financed
corporations. The likelihood that a BOC could drive such a competitor out
of the market is slim.
In addition, the Brooks-Dingell bill would have adequately protected
competitive concerns by setting forth standards for review. The Attorney
General is charged with approving only those applications where there is
"no substantial possibility 'the BOC' could use monopoly power to impede
competition."'' 3 Any party who, as a result of the ruling, suffers an injury
to its business or property, has an opportunity for judicial review."°4 By
including such safeguards, the Brooks-Dingell bill ensures that BOCs
cannot enter markets where they would have an opportunity to use their
local telephone monopoly to a detrimental, anticompetitive effect.
CONCLUSION
Provisions in House Bill 3626 to lift MFJ restrictions on BOCs would
have allowed local telephone companies to effectively compete in the
growing telecommunications industry without compromising concerns about
protecting American consumers from anticompetitive behavior. Enactment
of a similar measure in the next Congress would further the development
of the NII and increase competition for communications services, resulting
in lower prices and better service for consumers.
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House Bill 3626 would have given the FCC and the Attorney General
the power to review any authorizations for antitrust and public policy
concerns, fully empowering them to deny authorization to requests that do
not satisfy these standards. Further, the bill would have taken control of
telecommunications policy away from the decree court's triennial review
and appeal process, and replaced it with a more efficient and ininediate
review by agencies qualified to consider antitrust and communications
policy issues. Congress should use House Bill 3626 as a model when
proposing telecommunications reform legislation in the next session.

